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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
INFORMED CONSENT AS A CLINICAL
INDICATION FOR THE CHRONICALLY
SUICIDAL PATIENT WITH BORDERLINE
PERSONALITY DISORDER
Stephen H. Behnke* and Elyn R. Saks**
I. INTRODUCTION
Therapeutic jurisprudence,' a recent development in the law, is
based upon the idea that the law can, and should, promote the mental
health of the citizenry. Therapeutic jurisprudence does not claim
that the law should be concerned solely with furthering the thera-
peutic interests of individuals living within our society. Rather, it
states that promoting the psychological well-being of society is a le-
gitimate purpose of the law. A challenge for therapeutic jurispru-
dence is, therefore, to identify specific areas of the law that provide a
realistic opportunity to further this goal.
Identifying areas of the law ripe for a therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis requires a reasonable degree of psychological sophistication.
For example, an analysis must be able to determine which sector of
the population a given law is most likely to affect; to explore the psy-
chological dynamics of that sector; and, given these dynamics, to ex-
amine what effect the law is likely to have. Without all three compo-
nents the analysis will be incomplete.
This Article elaborates on the therapeutic jurisprudence litera-
ture in two ways. First, the Article illustrates a therapeutic jurispru-
dence analysis. Bruce Winick, the foremost proponent of therapeutic
* Chief Psychologist, Day Hospital Unit, Massachusetts Mental Health
Center; Instructor in Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School.
** Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychiatry, and the Behavioral Sciences
at the University of Southern California Law School.
1. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT 327, 328 n.3 (1997) (explaining that therapeutic jurisprudence refers
to the need for an assessment of the therapeutic impact of legal rules).
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jurisprudence, provides a useful example of a therapeutic jurispru-
dence analysis by examining the clinical implications of informed
consent.2 Winick demonstrates how obtaining informed consent may
bring about clinical gains by making the patient an active participant
in treatment decisions. 3 Winick argues that when a patient con-
sciously embraces a treatment goal she is more likely to achieve that
goal, especially when the treater predicts success.5 In analyzing the
benefits of informed consent, Winick looks to considerable empirical
evidence that when people are self-determining, they function more
effectively and with a higher degree of commitment and satisfaction.6
He points out that treating patients as competent adults enhances the
therapeutic alliance.
This Article takes Winick's discussion a step further by exploring
how informed consent may be especially beneficial to a particular
clinical population-namely, chronically suicidal individuals who
meet the criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD). The
Article discusses how a new treatment modality, dialectical behavior
therapy (DBT), makes obtaining informed consent an essential as-
pect of the treatment. The Article shows how patients appear to
benefit as a result of incorporating informed consent into DBT, and
will speculate about the reasons why doing so is helpful to patients.
This Article elaborates on the therapeutic jurisprudence litera-
ture in a second way by raising challenges to the concept of thera-
peutic jurisprudence. Our hope is that by providing an illustration of
therapeutic jurisprudence at work and exploring problems as yet un-
addressed by the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence, we will con-
tribute to the therapeutic jurisprudence literature. Our ultimate goal
is to provide concrete avenues by which the law can promote the
mental health and well-being of individuals who struggle with signifi-
cant psychological and behavioral difficulties.
2- See id. at 327.
3. See id. at 338-42.
4. This Article discusses the relationship between the legal doctrine of in-
formed consent and a clinical treatment for patients who meet criteria for bor-
derline personality disorder. Because borderline personality disorder is diag-
nosed primarily among women, the pronouns "she" and "her" are used
throughout the Article. See MARSHA LINEHAN, COGNnITVE-BEHAVIORAL
TREATMENT OF BORDERLINE PERSONALrrY DISORDER 55-56 (1993)
[hereinafter LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT].
5. See WINICK, supra note 1, at 330-32.
6. See id. at 333-34.
7. See id. at 338-42.
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II. THE CLINICAL POPULATION: INDIVIDUALS WHO MEET
CRITERIA FOR BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
In the United States, psychiatric diagnoses are most often made
according to the official nosology of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM).' The fourth edition of the DSM (DSM-IV) lists psychiatric
diagnoses along five "axes."9 Each axis indicates some aspect of an
individual's illness or life situation."0 Axis 1 lists clinical disorders."
Schizophrenia would be an example of a clinical disorder listed on
Axis 1.12 Personality disorders are listed on Axis 2.1 Axis 3 names
general medical conditions that have psychiatric implications." Hy-
pothyroidism, which can cause depressive symptoms, is an example of
a medical condition that would be listed on Axis 3 . Axis 4 lists
problems in the person's day-to-day life, such as difficulties in gaining
access to adequate health care, problems in obtaining employment,
and difficulties with the law. 6 Axis 5 contains the "global assessment
of functioning," a number on a scale from one to one hundred that
places the individual on a hypothetical continuum of mental health
according to psychological, social, and occupational functioning."
A personality disorder, listed on Axis 2, describes the manner in
which a person thinks and feels about himself or herself, the manner
in which a person relates to others, and the problems that ensue from
that way of experiencing the self and relating to others."' Put most
simply, a personality disorder refers to the difficulties attendant upon
a person's way of being in the world. Personality disorders tend to
affect all areas of a person's life, to begin in adolescence or early
adulthood, and to result in significant distress, impairment, or both. 9
Individuals who meet the criteria for BPD are some of the most
8. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
9. Id- at 25.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 25-26.
12. See id. at 26.
13. See id. at 26-27.
14. See id. at 27-28.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 30. One represents the lower end of the scale, while one hundred
represents superior functioning in all aspects of a person's life. See id.
18. See id. at 630.
19. See id. at 629.
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challenging patients clinicians treat.2° The difficulty in treating bor-
derline patients stems in large part from their propensity to engage in
high-risk behaviors-most notably behaviors that are intentionally
self-injurious. As many as four-fifths of borderline individuals have a
history of intentionally hurting themselves; often such acts are carried
out with the intent to die.21 In addition, individuals who meet the cri-
teria for this disorder tend to have highly unstable interpersonal re-
lationships and to engage in behavior that represents a high risk of
harm to themselves or to others, such as serious substance abuse or
unprotected sex with numerous partners.
The DSM-IV lists nine criteria for BPD.2 To merit the diagnosis
of BPD, an individual must meet at least five of the nine criteria23
The first of the nine criteria is that the individual engages in "frantic
efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment." 24 The important
word is "frantic"; often a borderline individual will become highly
anxious, or even suicidal, at the prospect of separation from an im-
portant person in her life and will take steps that appear extreme to
an outsider in order to avoid the separation. The second criterion is
"a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships charac-
terized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devalua-
tion."" Borderline individuals may treat new acquaintances like life-
long friends. Often such acquaintances are idealized, as if they could
do no wrong whatsoever, and then a complete fall-from-grace occurs
when they evince the most minor of faux pas, such as not acting suf-
ficiently empathic during a casual conversation.
The third of the nine criteria is an identity disturbance. Often,
borderline individuals have a markedly unstable sense of who they
are. This criterion may materialize as an individual taking on the char-
acteristics, thoughts, and beliefs of whatever group she happens to be
with at the moment, only to change such characteristics, thoughts, and
beliefs when she moves on to a new group, even if such a move occurs
within hours. The fourth criterion is impulsivity in areas that could be
20. See Marsha M. Linehan & Constance A. Kehrer, Borderline Personality
Disorder, in CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS: A STEP-
BY-STEP TREATMENT MANUAL 396, 396 (David H. Barlow ed., 2d ed. 1985).
21. See LINEHAN, CoGNmvE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 4.
22. See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 654.
23. See id, The DSM is, of course, only one nosology. For other ways of
thinking about BPD, see LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, su-
pra note 4, at 3-13.
24. DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 654.
25. Id.
26. See id.
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dangerous, such as frequent unprotected sex, substance abuse, reck-
less driving, or binge eating.27 The fifth criterion is "recurrent suici-
dal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior."
'
The sixth criterion is a marked emotional instability that results
from being highly reactive to internal or external stimuli.29 A bor-
derline individual may become enraged, or deeply sad, in immediate
response to a thought or to a perceived slight. The seventh criterion
is chronic feelings of emptiness, which are often felt physically." A
patient may say, for example, that there is a large hole in her stom-
ach, or that there is nothing inside. The eighth criterion is an intense,
inappropriate anger and is the single criterion perhaps most associ-
ated with BPD.31 The ninth and final criterion is a change in thought
processes, sometimes with a paranoid flavor, that arises when the in-
dividual is under stress.32
Marsha Linehan groups these nine criteria into five categories.33
According to Linehan, the DSM criteria can be reorganized on the
basis of a pervasive "dysregulation," or lack of regulation. 34 Her view
is that the essence of BPD is a dysregulation that permeates the bor-
derline individual's life.35 The domains affected therefore include the
individual's emotions, manner of relating to others, behavior, ways of
thinking, and manner of experiencing the self.
36
Emotional dysregulation refers to the emotional instability, the
difficulty in controlling and appropriately expressing anger, and the
highly reactive uality to emotional responses often seen in border-
line individuals. Interpersonal dysregulation-the dysregulated man-
ner of relating to others-refers to the highly intense and unstable qual-
ity of relationships, as well as to the extreme sensitivity to loss often
seen among borderline individuals.3' Behavioral dysregulation refers
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. Marsha Linehan has offered an alternative explanation for what
appears to be the centrality of anger in the psyche of the borderline individual.
See LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 70-71.
32 See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 654.
33. See LINEHAN, COGNrIIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
11-13.
34. Id. at 11.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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to the impulsive and suicidal behaviors characteristic of BPD.39
Cognitive dysregulation-dysregulation in ways of thinking-
represents brief, often stress-related forms of distorted thinking, such
as the feeling that others want to injure or are out "to get" you.40 Fi-
nally, self-dysregulation refers to a profound sense of inner-
emptiness or to the highly variable manner in which a borderline in-
dividual may experience who she is or who she ought to be.4'
Individuals who meet the criteria for BPD struggle with unsta-
ble, unpredictable, and often highly distressing thoughts, behaviors,
relationships, experiences of self, and emotions. In severe cases of
BPD it would not be too strong to describe an individual as volatile,
or even highly volatile, along one or more of these dimensions. Pro-
viders and consumers of mental health services would agree that the
lives and interactions of individuals who meet the criteria for BPD
are characterized by an intensity that can often be extreme.
III. CHRONIC SUICIDALITY AND BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
DISORDER: INDICATED AND NON-INDICATED INTERVENTIONS
One common feature of individuals who meet the criteria for
BPD is suicidal behavior. Indeed, suicidal behavior is one of the nine
criteria listed by DSM-IV as characteristic of BPD.41 Often the suici-
dal feelings experienced by borderline individuals are chronic. Indi-
viduals who meet borderline criteria may become suicidal in response
to what appear to be minor life events. Events which represent re-
jection, however slight, such as a therapist's inability to return a
phone call immediately or a therapist's vacation, are particularly dif-
ficult. Suicidal thoughts and feelings may become part of the fabric
of a borderline individual's life.4' Indeed, suicidality may take on anexistential quality, as if the pain in one's life is so great that it leaves
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 654. Marsha M. Linehan, one of the most
prolific writers on BPD and the psychologist who developed dialectical behavior
therapy-the only therapy shown to be effective in treating borderline individu-
als-realized after working with individuals who chronically engage in suicidal
behavior that the population and the borderline population largely overlap. See
LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 13-15.
43. See Donald A. Schwartz, The Suicidal Character, 51 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 64,
64-70 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz, Suicidal Character]; see also Donald A.
Schwartz et al., Treatment of the Suicidal Character, 28 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY
194, 199 (1974) [hereinafter Schwartz et al., Treatment] (adhering to the proposi-
tion that suicidality may become part of an individual's life).
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one to ask each day, literally, whether to be or not to be.
The suicidality seen among borderline individuals stands in con-
trast to the suicidality often experienced by other clinical popula-
tions. While suicidality experienced by borderline individuals may
take on a chronic, existential quality, suicidality is more often experi-
enced in other populations as the result of an acute psychiatric state
such as psychosis, major depression, or anxiety. The quality of the
suicidality may therefore depend upon whether the suicidality is an
aspect of a personality disorder that would be diagnosed along Axis
2, or whether the individual suffers from an Axis 1 disorder. In the
latter case, the suicidality is likely to pass when the psychosis, de-
pression, or anxiety subsides.4
The distinction between the manner in which suicidality is expe-
rienced has important implications for clinical treatment. Suicidality
that is secondary to an acute psychiatric state is generally treated by
keeping the individual in a safe and secure environment until the
clinical picture has stabilized.45 Often a locked psychiatric facility is
the setting of choice. Indeed, commitment laws are designed in large
part to address the individual who is acutely suicidal but whose suici-
dality will pass when the clinical syndrome giving rise to the suicidal-
ity is addressed and treated. Treatment of acute suicidality usually
can take place in a matter of days, at which point the individual is
released back into the community.
Chronic suicidality experienced by borderline individuals, how-
ever, requires treatment of a different kind,4 for reasons that are not
immediately obvious. One way to treat chronically suicidal indi-
viduals, for example, would be prolonged hospitalization.47 If, after
all, locked psychiatric facilities are the treatment of choice for suici-
dality, then that treatment should presumably continue as long as the
suicidal thoughts and feelings are present. Thus, civil commitment
could continue almost indefinitely for this group of patients, because
the suicidal thoughts and feelings may persist for years.
44. Individuals who suffer from chronic suicidality may, of course, experience
acute suicidality that arises from an Axis 1 syndrome.
45. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 35 (2d ed. 1991); see also SUICIDE: GUIDELINES
FOR ASsESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENT 179 (Bruce Bongar ed.,
1992) (discussing theory, research, special populations, assessment, treatment,
prevention, training, and legal issues of suicide).
46. See Thomas G. Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls in the Treatment of Border-
line Patients, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 9, 12 (1985) [hereinafter Gutheil, Medico-
legal Pitfalls].
47. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 45, at 41.
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An objection to this line of reasoning could be made on the
grounds that chronic suicidality is not real suicidality. Chronically
suicidal patients remain suicidal for lengthy periods of time-
sometimes for years-without actually killing themselves. As a con-
sequence, the objection goes, we ought to treat such patients differ-
ently from the way we treat acutely suicidal patients, because their
risk of actually committing suicide is lower. The problem with this
objection, however, is that chronically suicidal patients with BPD do
commit suicide, at rates far above those found in the general popula-
tion.? Indeed, the rates of suicide among patients suffering from
BPD have been found to be between 4 and 9.5%.49 Studies have
shown that the rate of suicide among borderline individuals is equal
to the rate among individuals suffering from other psychiatric disor-
ders that also represent a high risk of suicide.5' Rates of suicide
among the general population, on the other hand, are approximately
12 out of every 100,000 persons per year.5' From both a clinical and
societal perspective, borderline patients cannot be refused hospitali-
zation solely on the grounds that the likelihood of suicide is slight.52
A clinical observation that speaks against hospitalization is that
placing a chronically suicidal individual in a locked unit often appears
to exacerbate the patient's situation. That is to say, it appears that
these patients actually get worse when placed in a psychiatric hospi-
tal. The reasons for this are unclear. Some suggest that the inviting
characteristics of an inpatient setting may reward suicidal behavior,
while at the same time making it more difficult for the patient to
deal with the life situations generating the stress and anxiety that lie
48. See generally Paul H. Soloff et al., Risk Factors for Suicidal Behavior in
Borderline Personality Disorder, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1316 (1994)
(comparing the suicide rates between borderline patients and the general popu-
lation).
49. See Harrison G. Pope, Jr., et al., The Validity of DSM-III Borderline Per-
sonality Disorder: A Phenomenologic, Family History, Treatment Response, and
Long-term Follow-up Study, 40 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 23, 27 (1983); Mi-
chael H. Stone et al., Natural History of Borderline Patients Treated by Intensive
Hospitalization, 10 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 185, 190 (1987).
50. See Gunnar Kullgren et al., An Empirical Study of Borderline Personality
Disorder and Psychiatric Suicides, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASEs 328,
329 (1986).
51. See David C. Clark & Jan Fawcett, An Empirically Based Model of Sui-
cide Risk Assessment for Patients with Affective Disorder, in SUICIDE AND
CLINICAL PRACriCE 16 (Douglas Jacobs ed., 1992).
52. Clinicians will sometimes ignore this fact and argue that suicidality among
this population is not real or is only an attempt to manipulate caregivers, family,
or friends.
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behind the intensification of suicidal thoughts and feelings.
In fact, the mothering behavior [of the hospital setting] may
enhance suicide risk, since it creates a secondary gain for
suicidal behaviors .... [T]he maintenance of focus on the
patient's suicidality can act as an obstruction to his coming
to deal with the problems underlying his suicidality and his
life problems in general. Constant preoccupation with sui-
cide may actually act to increase the risk of it."
Marsha Linehan has argued forcefully that psychiatric hospitali-
zation is clinically contraindicated for many patients in this popula-
tion; much of her work is centered upon keeping chronically suicidal
patients out of the hospital.54 Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Gutheil
likewise observe:
A specific population requiring consideration is the group of
chronically, as opposed to acutely, suicidal patients. This
type of patient offers a unique challenge to the diagnostician
in the emergency setting, since actual suicide is a perpetual
risk, yet hospitalization tends to promote regression and
should often be actively resisted .
Chronically suicidal, borderline patients, therefore present a medico-
legal Catch-22: their suicidality is indeed real, but the law's usual re-
sponse to suicidality-inpatient hospitalization-appears to work
against their clinical best interests. What are treaters able to do?
An observation shared by clinicians of widely divergent theoreti-
cal orientations is that the therapeutic alliance represents a powerful
clinical tool in the treatment of chronically suicidal, borderline indi-
viduals.56 Although the therapeutic relationship is considered central
in all treatments, it appears to take on a special role when treating
individuals who struggle with borderline psychopathology. Often the
nature of the treater-patient relationship takes center stage when a
53. Schwartz, Suicidal Character, supra note 43, at 199-200.
54. See LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
510-14.
55. APPELBAUM & GuTHEIL, supra note 45, at 65; see generally Henry J.
Friedman, Some Problems of Inpatient Management with Borderline Patients, 126
AM. J. PsycmATRY 299 (1969) (discussing behavioral regression of borderline
patients in a hospital setting).
56. See APPELBAUM & GUrHEIL, supra note 45, at 65; Mark Goldblatt &
Alan Schatzberg, Medication and the Suicidal Patient, in SUICIDE AND CLINICAL
PRACticE 23, 27 (Douglas Jacobs ed., 1992); Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra
note 46, at 13; Thomas G. Gutheil, Suicide and Suit: Liability After Self-
destruction, in SUICIDE AND CLINICAL PRACrICE 147, 160 (Douglas Jacobs ed.,
1992) [hereinafter Gutheil, Suicide and Suit].
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clinician is attempting to address the suicidal thoughts and feelings
experienced by a client in this population.
The essential quality of the therapeutic relationship is collabora-
tion in the truest sense of the word. Collaboration derives from Latin
and means "to work together," as opposed to work against or to work
on. Collaboration implies two individuals working side-by-side to-
ward a mutually agreed-upon end. In a collaborative treatment rela-
tionship, both treater and patient view themselves as autonomous
agents, making conscious choices that will eventually result in greater
psychological health for the patient. Clinicians across theoretical
spectrums have agreed that a collaborative working relationship is
the keystone of a successful treatment and is pivotal when dealing
with the intense suicidal thoughts and feelings of a chronically suici-
dal individual.58
From a therapeutic standpoint, one essential characteristic of a
collaborative relationship is that the patient is an equal partner, one
whose values, goals, and visions of the outcome are valued as much
as those of the treater. The experience of autonomy in the treatment
relationship entails an experience of ownership; choices are one's
very own choices. Choices that are one's own, however, are also
choices for which one is responsible. Thus, responsibility is the nec-
essary counterpart of autonomy. From a clinical perspective, this
equation makes sense. A patient will not feel responsible for choices
that she does not perceive to be her own autonomous choices. A
sense of autonomy is a necessary-perhaps not a sufficient, but cer-
tainly a necessary-ingredient for assuming responsibility. A sense
of autonomy and the willingness to assume responsibility go hand-in-
hand.
The literature on BPD has underscored the value of enhancing
patient autonomy as part of the treatment. Marsha Linehan has writ-
ten eloquently about this element in working with borderline pa-
tients.'9 Linehan refers to a "dialectical dilemma" in the treatment of
borderline individuals: that of "active passivity" versus "apparent
competence."' 6
Linehan defines "active passivity" as the tendency of borderline
57. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIoNARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
371 (3d ed. 1992).
5& See, e.g., WINicK, supra note 1, at 328-42.
59. See LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
107.
60. Id. at 84-85.
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individuals to approach problems in a passive manner in an attempt
to get others to solve problems for them." Thus, the patient actively
seeks help from her external environment to solve problems that she
passively addresses herself. Active passivity is distinct from learned
helplessness; while learned helplessness represents a surrender to
problems that the individual perceives cannot be resolved, active
passivity entails an active effort to bring about change through the
agency of others. 2 According to Linehan, active passivity is a learned
behavior: a deficit in active problem-solving skills, combined with a
sense of personal inadequacy and a history of failure despite having
made one's best efforts, may result in an individual who continually
attempts to have others solve her problems for her." In this context
intentional self-injury may be the most effective manner for a bor-
derline patient to marshal forces on her behalf in the face of a prob-
lem that she views as insurmountable. Self-injury is often interpreted
by others as manipulative because it is designed to achieve an end
other than-if only in addition to-the apparent goal of hurting one-
self.
Linehan defines "apparent competence" as the tendency of bor-
derline individuals sometimes to act competently when addressing
problems encountered in day-to-day living.6 At other times, how-
ever, the individual will not be able to meet successfully the challenge
of a problem that is no more difficult.6' Apparent competency leads
to a highly uneven quality to the individual's life, insofar as she is
able, for example, to deal with problems at work in an adequate or
even superior fashion, yet unable to deal with the most straightfor-
ward problems or challenges in her personal life. Linehan offers a
number of explanations for borderline individuals being "stable in
[their] instability."' ' First, competency expressed in one domain of
the borderline individual's life does not generalize to other domains. 67
Second, the borderline individual has severe deficits in her capacity
to regulate moods. Because her behavior is highly mood-dependent,
61. See id. at 78.
62. See id. at 79.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 80-84.
66. THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY, DSM-III: Axis II
341 (1981) (quoting M. Schmideberg, The Borderline Patient, in 1 AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHiATRY 399 (S. Arieti ed., 1959)).
67. See LINEHAN, COGNrrIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
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shifts in mood bring about dramatic shifts in the capacity to behave in
an organized and effective manner.6 Like the borderline individual's
active passivity, her apparent competence may be interpreted as ma-
nipulative because she often appears to have competencies far ex-
ceeding those she actually possesses.'
Active passivity and apparent competence pose particular prob-
lems for the borderline patient's experience of herself as an autono-
mous and hence responsible agent. The problems arise because her
competence in dealing with problems encountered in everyday life is
fleeting and unstable. While her apparent competence serves to
communicate to others that she is capable of successfully addressing
difficulties on her own, the competence depends on her emotional
state and the interpersonal context. When these change, she may
- find herself faced with problems that she perceives as utterly insur-
mountable. Now, desperate for help, she finds herself mindful of her
history of failure in negotiating precisely such challenges, yet unable
to ask directly for the help she needs. The borderline individual may
then turn to indirect ways of communicating her desperation, ways
that may include intentionally self-injurious behavior. Such behavior
communicates both to others and to the borderline individual herself
that she is unable to cope with the current state of affairs. Such be-
haviors do little, however, to change that state of affairs in any help-
ful way.
The apparent competence and active passivity of borderline in-
dividuals tempt treaters to step in and either attempt to solve the pa-
tient's problems for her or, at the very least, to absolve the borderline
patient from responsibility for engaging in unacceptable conduct.
Lured by a wish to take care of the patient and to keep the patient
safe, treaters may well consider that hospitalization is a sensible and
effective treatment intervention. Nevertheless, hospitalization may
profoundly deprive a patient of the capacity to exercise her auton-
68. See id. at 82.
69. One could argue that a more appropriate term would be "apparent in-
competence," insofar as the individual is truly competent at certain times and in
certain situations, thus indicating that she actually does possess the competencies
in question. To phrase the matter in this fashion, however, would miss the point
that the borderline patient experiences her competence as transient; it simply
does not feel real to her many times and in many situations. Because compe-
tence is, in large part, a state of mind, and because the psychological states of
borderline patients fluctuate dramatically, it seems more clinically appropriate to
use the term "apparent competence," thereby indicating that, from a psychologi-
cal standpoint, borderline individuals experience their competence as the excep-
tion rather than as the rule.
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omy. And it is precisely the sense of autonomy that is so vital to the
treatment of borderline individuals.
From a clinical perspective, the hope is that as the patient as-
sumes a greater responsibility for herself and for her actions, her
sense of herself as an autonomous agent will grow. As the patient in-
creasingly experiences herself as an autonomous agent, her sense of
responsibility will increase, thus setting in motion a therapeutically
indicated synergy. If the patient is never pushed in the direction of
taking greater responsibility for who she is and what she does, it is
unlikely that she will begin to experience her own sense of agency in
the world. Instead, she will likely remain in the grip of active passiv-
ity and apparent competence; that is, she is likely to remain border-
line.
Thomas Gutheil has described the dilemma facing the clinician
who must make treatment decisions about the chronically suicidal
borderline patient.7 0 Gutheil points out that hospitalization may en-
tail the treater assuming the very responsibility that the borderline
patient must learn to bear.7' Gutheil also recognizes, however, that
failure to hospitalize a suicidal patient asking for help is problem-
atic.n He describes the situation by first acknowledging that not
admitting a chronically suicidal patient to a psychiatric unit
may strike the lay person as callous or uncaring. For exam-
ple, clinicians are quite familiar with the seemingly desper-
ate patient who should, on clinical grounds, be refused hos-
pital admission to avert regression and to foster the
assumption of personal responsibility. This example cap-
tures the way in which a short-term risk (i.e., that the pa-
tient will actually kill himself or herself, even by accident, in
a context that appears to relate this event to the "rejection"
by the hospital) is weighed against a long-term advantage
(i.e., modification of character problems) that must of ne-
cessity remain only a potential until the patient actually im-
proves. To put this in crudest possible terms, the evalua-
tor's choice, largely by hindsight, appears to lie between two
outcomes: a concrete dead body and the rather abstract
notion of personal growth.73
The dilemma Gutheil underscores is that clinical interests may
70. See Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46, at 12-13.
71. See id. at 12.
72. See id at 12-13.
73. Id. at 12.
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call for keeping such a patient out of the hospital, while concerns
about professional liability appear to call for the opposite.74 Thera-
peutic jurisprudence would ask whether the law could address this
apparent paradox so that the clinician is given incentives to act in a
manner consistent with the patient's clinical interests. Put another
way, therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether the law could help to
bring into explicit harmony the value of providing the patient good
clinical care and the value of ensuring that the treater take seriously
her medico-legal responsibilities in caring for suicidal patients. In at-
tempting to resolve this dilemma, therapeutic jurisprudence could
look to the doctrine of informed consent.
IV. THE DOCRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent is a doctrine with legal, ethical, and interper-
sonal dimensions.75 From a legal perspective, informed consent refers
to a set of rules by which a practitioner must abide.76 Failure to ad-
here to these rules may result in legal sanctions.77 From an ethical
perspective, informed consent underscores the value of individual
autonomy, a value that both flows out of and protects human dig-
nity.78 From an interpersonal perspective, informed consent refers to
a central aspect of the relationship between a treater and patient.79
The legal doctrine of informed consent has developed in the
United States over the past several decades.'o Most of this evolution
has taken place in the past thirty years.8' Those who practiced medi-
cine as recently as the 1950s would not recognize the current doc-
trine. The most significant development in the doctrine arose from
court cases that shifted the emphasis from simply obtaining consent
to ensuring that the consent was informed.s2
74. It could be argued--correctly, we believe-that the best protection
against liability is for the treater to do whatever is in the patient's best clinical in-
terest. As Gutheil points out, however, the reality of a dead body carries such
anxiety about professional repercussions that a treater will often seek to avoid
such an outcome at all costs, at least as long as the patient remains in his or her
care. See id. at 12-13.
75. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY
& CLINICAL PRACTICE 12-13 (1987).
76. See id at 3.
77. See id
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 38-41.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 38-39.
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Up through the 1950s cases involving informed consent were
analyzed primarily in terms of whether a patient had consented to
treatment8 Consent was important because its absence gave rise to
an action in battery, should the treatment entail a touching. 4 Many
cases addressed what actions, or inactions, could reasonably imply
consent.85 The primary focus, however, remained on whether a pa-
tient had consented to the treatment."5 The value behind the doctrine
was that of a patient's right to be free from unwanted bodily intru-
sion.
In the early 1960s, the courts shifted the emphasis of their analy-
ses.8 While an unconsented to touching remained actionable, an im-
portant focus became whether the consent was informed.8  An in-
formed decision was held to be a decision made after certain
information had been provided; the important information included
the nature and purpose of the treatment, the risks and benefits of the
treatment, the alternatives to treatment, and the risks and benefits of
the alternatives, including no treatment at all.8
The shift of concern from consent to the informed nature of de-
cision making represented an important shift in the values behind the
doctrine. While the doctrine previously embodied the value of a pa-
tient's right to be free from an unwanted touching-a privacy inter-
est-the emphasis became whether the patient was sufficiently in-
formed to make an autonomous decision about the nature and course
of treatment. The shift from an emphasis on protecting the individ-
ual's bodily integrity to emphasizing the individual's autonomy had
enormous ethical implications.
The ethical doctrine of informed consent states that an individ-
ual has an inherent dignity to his or her humanity."° This dignity
implies a right to make decisions about the nature, course, and pur-
pose of one's own life. The individual making the decision must be
informed about relevant aspects of the decision, must understand
those aspects, and, based upon such information and understanding,
must voluntarily decide to accept or forgo treatment. The ethical
doctrine of informed consent is grounded firmly in the value of indi-
83. See id. at 36.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 36-37.
86. See id. at 37.
87. See id. at 40.
8& See id. at 40-41.
89. See id. at 14.
90. See id at 22.
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vidual autonomy. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
said, "[e]ven if the patient's choice will not achieve the restoration of
the patient's health..., that choice must be respected. The patient
has the right to be wrong in the choice of treatment." 91
The interpersonal dimension of informed consent speaks to the
quality of the relationship between treater and patient. Treaters are
in positions of enormous power and can behave in a manner that en-
hances or denigrates patient autonomy and dignity. While informa-
tion, understanding, and voluntary acceptance of a treatment are es-
sential elements of informed consent, they fail to capture that the
doctrine is fundamentally an interpersonal doctrine. That is to say,
informed consent takes place in the context of an interpersonal rela-
tionship, and the quality of that relationship will inevitably speak to
the quality of the consent. The interpersonal aspect of the doctrine
of informed consent is sometimes discussed under the rubric of "the
alliance." 92 The legal, ethical, and interpersonal dimensions of in-
formed consent provide the rich understanding necessary to explore
the relationship between informed consent and the clinically indi-
cated treatment of the chronically suicidal borderline patient.
V. COMPETENCE, INFORMED CONSENT, AND DIALECTICAL
BEHAVIORAL THERAPY
Every competent adult has the right to informed consent con-
cerning his or her medical treatment. The right to informed consent
entails three components: that the adult is competent to consent, is
informed about the relevant aspects of the treatment and alternatives
to the treatment, and voluntarily consents to the treatment.?3 The
notion of competency is that the individual is able to understand,
consider rationally, and indicate a choice concerning the available
treatments. A competent adult is informed when all relevant infor-
mation is available, information that includes the risks and benefits of
a treatment, the risks and benefits of alternative treatments, and the
risks and benefits of no treatment at all. Consent entails the freedom
to choose, free from external constraints or undue duress. Thus, an
adult who is capable of understanding relevant information about
medical treatment and communicating a treatment choice has the
right to have information about what choices are available and to ac-
91. Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308,
316 n.15 (Mass. 1983).
92. Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46, at 13.
93. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 75, at 57.
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cept or reject the treatment offered. The right of a competent adult
to informed consent is founded upon the value of individual auton-
94omy.
Thomas Gutheil has written about assessing the competence of a
chronically suicidal patient with BPD. 5 Gutheil's assessment of
competence entails determining whether the individual is aware of
her own psychological processes, able to identify an appropriate in-
dividual to whom those processes can be communicated when they
threaten the individual's safety, and capable of communicating those
processes to such an identified individual.96
Gutheil provides several examples of how competence to engage
in treatment is assessed in a clinical interview by asking questions
that speak to the relevant capacities.
" Do you realize I can't help you if you don't level with me?
" Do you understand the only way I'll know what's on your
mind is if you tell me?
* Do you know what to do if things turn bad on you when
you are outside the hospital?
9 Do you know what to do if you feel the impulse to hurt
yourself getting stronger?
* Do you have some plans as to what to do if you find your
suicidal feelings coming back while you are on this pass?
e Do you know whom to call and do you have the number
for the hospital (or the emergency room, the clinician, the
ambulance service, etc.)?'
As the questions indicate, Gutheil focuses on whether the indi-
vidual has the capacity to identify problematic internal states, to
identify appropriate individuals capable of providing emergent care,
and to communicate the problematic internal state to the identified
individual or individuals. The problematic states for the chronically
suicidal individual are those psychological states in which she is more
likely to act impulsively" than upon organized and planned thought.
The appropriate treaters are those individuals trained to assess and
treat suicidal thoughts and feelings. The ability to communicate en-
94. See id.
95. See Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46, at 12-13.
96. See Gutheil, Suicide and Suit, supra note 56, at 159-61.
97. Id. at 160-61.
98. See John G. Gunderson & Margaret T. Singer, Defining Borderline Pa-
tients: An Overview, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 4-5 (1975).
April 1998]
962 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:945
tails the ability to put the suicidal thoughts and feelings into words,
rather than to act on them in a self-destructive fashion.
Gutheil underscores the inherent unpredictability of knowing
when the patient will experience suicidal thoughts, feelings, and im-
pulses." As a consequence, his assessment of the patient's compe-
tence also entails determining whether the patient has the capacity to
make a plan for a contingent event.' Gutheil urges the clinician to
share this uncertainty with the patient. "By... inviting the patient to
share the risk of the situation facing the dyad, the therapist brings the
uncertainty into the realm of therapeutic work, rather than feeling,
oppositionally, that his task is to outguess the patient or foretell the
future, feats outside the realm of the possible." ' The patient's com-
petence depends on how well she can manage the unpredictability of
her shifting internal states.
Assessing the competence of a chronically suicidal individual to
engage in treatment is the first step to determine whether that indi-
vidual can consent to a course of treatment. If the individual is
deemed not competent in the manner described above, or if an ade-
quate assessment cannot be conducted, the treatment of choice will
be inpatient hospitalization, for two reasons. First, the patient is
stating that she is incapable of assessing her own internal states, of
identifying appropriate individuals to whom suicidal thoughts and
feelings could be communicated, or of actually communicating her
suicidality to those individuals. Inpatient hospitalization may also be
indicated because the therapeutic alliance is not sufficiently devel-
oped to make possible the assessment of competency to engage in the
treatment. That is to say, patient and treater do not know or trust
one another well enough to allow the treater to determine what the
patient's true capacities are. In such a case, where competency can-
not be assessed, the patient should be placed on a psychiatric unit
until an adequate assessment can be conducted.
If the patient is deemed competent, the treater may offer a
course of treatment. To do so, the treater must first obtain the pa-
tient's informed consent. It must be made clear that one facet of the
treatment entails keeping the patient out of the hospital and that this
aspect of the treatment entails a risk-the risk of death. Other risks
99. See Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46, at 12-13.
100. See Gutheil, Suicide and Suit, supra note 56, at 160-61.
101. Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46, at 13; see Gutheil et al., Mal-
practice Prevention Through the Sharing of Uncertainty: Informed Consent and
the Therapeutic Alliance, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 49, 50 (1984).
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and benefits of the treatment will need to be explained as well, but
the risk of death must be a central feature to the informed consent of
the chronically suicidal borderline patient.
A treatment that has been found effective for chronically para-
suicidal" 2 patients with BPD is dialectical behavior therapy (DBT).
DBT is a cognitive-behavioral outpatient treatment designed specifi-
cally for this population."3 DBT shares many of the aspects of tradi-
tional cognitive-behavioral therapy. Common to cognitive therapies,
DBT focuses on disordered patterns of thinking. Common to behav-
ioral therapies, DBT makes treatment goals clear at the outset of the
therapy and measures in concrete and certain ways the progress pa-
tients make toward those goals.
DBT embodies the doctrine of informed consent in both theory
and practice. To explore why, the doctrine of informed consent may
be broken down into four components:
(1) The value of individual autonomy that underlies the
doctrine and the manner in which furthering this value by
obtaining informed consent takes place in the context of an
interpersonal relationship.
(2) The assessment of competence that precedes obtaining
informed consent.
(3) The nature of the information that must be shared for
the consent to be informed.
(4) The patient's actual consent to the treatment offered.
There is a particularly good fit between DBT and informed consent
along each of these four dimensions.
VI. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND THE THERAPEUTIC
RELATIONSHIP
DBT is based upon a collaborative relationship between thera-
pist and patient. In the words of Marsha Linehan, the psychologist
who developed DBT, "[a]t times, this relationship is the only thing
that keeps [borderline patients] alve.'"" Linehan's emphasis on the
quality of the relationship permeates the treatment:
102. Linehan defines parasuicidal behavior as "any intentional, acute self-
injurious behavior with or without suicidal intent, including both suicide attempts
and self-mutalitive behaviors." Marsha M. Linehan et al., Cognitive-Behavioral
Treatment of Chronically Parasuicidal Borderline Patients, 48 ARcHivEs GE-N.
PSYCmATRY 1060, 1060 (1991).
103. See id.
104. LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORALTREATMENT, supra note 4, at 21.
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The therapist must work to establish a strong, positive in-
terpersonal relationship with the patient right from the be-
ginning .... With a highly suicidal patient, the relationship
with the therapist is at times what keeps her alive when all
else fails .... DBT works on the premise that the experi-
ence of being genuinely accepted and cared for and about is
of value in its own right, apart from any changes that the
patient makes as a result of the therapy. Not much in DBT
can be done before this relationship is developed.105
Linehan's final statement is particularly telling. The relationship is
the basis out of which the healing power of the treatment develops.
The nature of the therapeutic relationship Linehan envisions
supports the patient's autonomy. Linehan is explicit about the goal
of DBT: a life worth living. 6 She is equally explicit about why:
"Borderline patients' frequent voiced dissatisfaction with their lives
are valid. They are indeed in a living hell. If patients' complaints and
descriptions of their own lives are taken at all seriously, this assump-
tion is self-evident. Given this fact, the only solution is to change
their lives."'1'
Linehan is clear that what makes life worth living depends upon
the patient's own values, not upon those of the therapist:
[F]lexibility and respect for the patient's own wishes, goals,
and ideas about "how to get from here to there" are needed.
Thus, the therapist should avoid being judgmental about the
patient's choice of goals and/or commitments. The therapist
should be careful not to impose his or her own goals or
treatment procedures on the patient when such goals or
procedures are not dictated by DBT or the therapist's own
limits. Although it is tempting to present arbitrary therapist
choices or preferences as necessary, such a tendency must
somehow be averted or corrected when noticed."°
The therapeutic relationship in DBT is based upon a respect for the
patient's own "wishes, goals, and ideas" about what constitutes a life
worth living. 10
Consistent with a respect for the patient's values and choices,
105. Id. at 98.
106. See id at 100.
107. Me
108. See id. at 286.
109. Id
110. Id
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Linehan believes that a therapist practicing DBT must be willing to
recognize, acknowledge, and admit his or her mistakes."' Linehan
sees these characteristics as central to the therapeutic relationship.'1 2
She elaborates on this idea by explaining that therapists must be
willing to repair a relationship that has been damaged by their mis-
takes because "in such a complex and difficult therapeutic endeavor,
mistakes are inevitable; what the therapist does afterwards is a better
index of good therapy." ' " By placing the burden on the therapist to
admit and repair mistakes for which he or she is responsible, Linehan
highlights the equality of patient and therapist. It is precisely this
equality that best demonstrates the treatment's respect for the pa-
tient's autonomy.
Linehan further underscores the importance of treating the pa-
tient as an equal partner by noting how easily therapists fall into the
trap of pathologizing the patient when the therapy goes awry.14
Linehan remarks how this trap is especially inviting for therapists
who work with borderline patients. "I suspect that many therapeutic
failures in commitment that have been laid at the feet of borderline
patients could more properly be laid at the feet of their therapists."'15
The danger is sufficiently great that a foundation of DBT is the
premise that patients cannot fail in therapy. According to Linehan,
"when patients drop out of therapy, fail to progress, or actually get
worse while in DBT, the therapy, the therapist, or both have failed.
If the therapy has been applied according to protocol, and the pa-
tients still do not improve, then the failure is attributable to the ther-
apy itself."" 6 By not automatically attributing therapeutic stalemates
or failures to the patient's pathology, the dialectical behavior thera-
pist assumes equal responsibility for the therapeutic relationship.
The equality of therapist and patient is especially evident at the
beginning of the therapy. First, during the initial sessions a therapist
and patient decide whether they can work together. The assignment
of patient to therapist is not assumed final. Second, the therapist and
patient must each agree to several conditions before the treatment
can actually begin. The patient agrees to make every effort to stay in
therapy for a specified period of time, usually one year at the outset;
111. See id. at 110-11.
112. See id.
113. Id at 110.
114. See id at 111.
115. IM at 285.
116. Id at 108.
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to attend therapy sessions; to reduce parasuicidal behaviors; to re-
duce behaviors that interfere with therapy; to participate in necessary
adjunctive aspects of the therapy; and to abide by fee arrangements.
The therapist agrees to make every reasonable effort to conduct the
therapy in a competent manner; to conduct the therapy in an ethical
manner; to respect the integrity and rights of the patient; to protect
the patient's confidentiality; to attend all sessions; and to obtain con-
sultation as needed. The fact that the therapy cannot go forward
until both therapist and patient agree to work together, and agree on
certain conditions of how the therapy will proceed, further elaborates
the egalitarian, collaborative nature of DBT.
Linehan is clear that the collaborative nature of the relationship
does not detract from the patient's primary responsibility in deter-.~~~ .IT17 ~
mining the course of the therapy and of her life. A central assump-
tion upon which Linehan bases DBT is that
a borderline patient has to change her own behavioral re-
sponses and alter her environment for her life to change...
[T]he therapist cannot save the patient. Although it may
be true that the patient cannot change on her own and that
she needs help, the lion's share of the work nonetheless will
be done by the patient.118
Linehan points out that placing primary responsibility upon the pa-
tient to change her own life entails serious risks-literally of life or
death-that the therapist must accept if the treatment is to be suc-
cessful."' If the therapist cannot accept such a risk and strives to
keep the patient alive at all costs, a patient will inevitably fail to
achieve the goal of a life worth living. "Acceptance of the possibility
that the patient may commit suicide is an essential requisite for con-
ducting DBT. The other alternative, however-in which the patient
stays alive, but within a life filled with intolerable emotional pain-is
not viewed as tenable. 120 Linehan places the risks incumbent upon
the therapist in stark relief.121 The important point is that the risks
are taken in the service of the patient's growth toward the goal of the
therapy: a life worth living, as the patient herself envisions that life.
Obtaining informed consent takes place within the context of a
collaborative therapeutic relationship that fosters the patient's
117. See id. at 107.
118. Id.
119. See id
120. Id. at 108.
121. See id.
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autonomy. Put another way, obtaining informed consent is an inter-
personal event that holds the potential to further, or inhibit, the pa-
tient's choices about the life she would like to live. Ideally, informed
consent fosters these choices.
DBT breathes life into the values behind the doctrine of in-
formed consent by:
(1) highlighting the importance of the therapeutic relation-
ship;
(2) setting a goal-a life worth living-that the patient will
define with her own values, wishes, and ideals;
(3) the therapist's nurturing the patient's goals in a non-
judgmental way;
(4) refusing to blame the patient when the therapy goes
awry;
(5) the therapist's willingness to recognize, acknowledge,
and repair mistakes;
(6) allowing therapy to commence only when therapist and
patient have mutually agreed they can work together;
(7) having both therapist and patient agree to conditions
upon which the therapy will proceed;
(8) ultimately holding the patient responsible for achieving
her goal of a life worth living, however she chooses to define
such a life.
While certain therapies contain one of more of these elements, DBT
makes each an explicit aspect of the treatment. Striking is that the
centrality of these elements to DBT is based primarily upon their
therapeutic efficacy. At the same time, they bring alive the values
underlying the legal doctrine of informed consent.
VI. ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO ENGAGE N THE TREATMENT
Individuals are generally assumed competent to consent to
treatment. This assumption holds until evidence to the contrary
arises, at which time it may be necessary to assess an individual's
competence. Competence may be assessed in a variety of ways that
range from requiring very little of the patient's capacities to those
that demand a significant showing of cognitive ability. As examples,
the questions asked to determine competence may be whether the
patient is simply able to make a decision; whether the patient can un-
derstand the information presented; whether the patient can manipu-
late the information presented in a rational manner; and whether the
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patient can make a reasonable decision about the treatment of-
fered.'22 Borderline patients are generally competent by each of
these standards.
Far more complex with a chronically suicidal borderline patient
is assessing the individual's competence to engage in treatment. As-
sessing competence to engage in treatment will require determining
whether the individual is aware of her own psychological processes,
including the propensity to act on impulse; whether the individual is
able to identify an appropriate individual to whom those processes
can be communicated when they threaten the individual's safety; and
whether the individual is actually capable of communicating those
processes to such an identified individual.
Because the mental status of borderline individuals is prone to
change in response to external events, as well as in response to the
individual's own psychological processes, it is important that the
competency of these individuals be assessed in an ongoing manner.
Dialectical behavior theory builds into the treatment mechanisms
that allow the therapist to assess the patient's competence to engage
in treatment on a regular basis. The assessment of this competence
takes place in two ways: through the use of "diary cards" and
through phone contact between the therapist and patient.
Diary cards are written forms that the patient brings to therapy
each week. The cards provide a forum for the patient to report on a
variety of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that have occurred since
the previous treatment session. Specific behaviors asked about in-
clude the frequency and intensity of substance abuse, as well as any
self-harming behaviors. In addition, the patient indicates the degree
and intensity of thoughts and urges to harm herself. Finally, the pa-
tient indicates whether she was able to use techniques learned in the
therapy to cope with these behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. The di-
ary card is the first item on the agenda for each individual therapy
session. Dialectical behavior therapists review the card in order to
determine what material will receive priority as a topic of discussion
during a given hour.
Diary cards serve a number of purposes, the primary of which is
therapeutic. The information on the cards is a benchmark for the
patient's mental state during the past week. In addition, the cards
provide concrete information for the therapist about what the patient
thought, felt, and did since their last meeting.
122. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 75, at 84-89.
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The process of having the patient fill out and present a diary
card to the therapist each session is relevant to her competence to
engage in treatment in two ways. First, practice makes patients bet-
ter at reporting. The diary card is a way for the patient to learn how
to read and report her own internal states. In this regard, compe-
tence to engage in treatment is an acquired skill. Patients can im-
prove. Second, through the diary cards the therapist has the patient's
first-hand report about her thoughts, feelings, and behaviors during a
specified period of time. While the therapist cannot assume that the
diary cards are a completely veridical account of what occurred, the
diary card does give the therapist the opportunity to determine how
the patient responded to certain internal states. As an example, the
protocol for handling diary cards requires that a report of any inten-
tional self-harm, or intense suicidal thoughts or urges, be addressed
on a priority basis during that particular session. As a consequence,
the therapist is able to assess immediately the patient's capacity for
handling such thoughts, urges, or behavior in an appropriate fashion
simply by discussing what the patient did.
Telephone calls are a second such mechanism. Telephone con-
tact with the individual therapist is a central part of DBT. Dialectical
behavior therapists explain to patients the centrality of telephone
contacts at the outset of the therapy. A dialectical behavior therapist
will actively explore with a patient unable or unwilling to make tele-
phone calls what can be done to increase her participation in this as-
pect of the treatment.
Two reasons speak to why telephone contact is another way for
the therapist both to assess the borderline patient's competence to
engage in treatment, as well as to increase that competence. First,
according to Linehan, a therapeutic reason underlying the value of
telephone contact is that
many suicidal and borderline individuals have enormous
difficulty asking for help effectively. Some are inhibited
from asking for help directly by fear, shame, or beliefs that
they are undeserving or their needs are invalid; they may in-
stead engage in parasuicidal behavior or other crisis behav-
iors as a "cry for help." Other patients have no difficulty
asking for help, but do so in a demanding or abusive man-
ner, act in a way that makes potential benefactors feel ma-
nipulated, or use other ineffective strategies."
123. LINEHAN, COGNrrIVE-BEHAVIORALTREATMENT, supra note 4, at 104.
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Telephone contact affords the therapist the opportunity both to as-
sess the patient's competence to identify and appropriately commu-
nicate her internal states, as well as to assist the patient in improving
these capacities.
Second, the content of the telephone calls has a highly specific
structure. DBT permits telephone contact in two situations, one of
which is germane to the patient's competence to engage in treatment:
"when the patient is in a crisis or is facing a problem she cannot solve
on her own."'24 In such a case the therapist will use the telephone
contact to focus on helping the patient apply the techniques she has
learned in the therapy to the crisis or problem.
The idea is that the patient may know how to use skills in a
situation of low stress-a therapy session-but have enormous diffi-
culty applying those skills to situations encountered in everyday life.
Thus, the patient is encouraged to call the therapist when the patient
is in a situation she experiences as highly stressful and when she is
likely to engage in self-injurious behavior. During such a phone call,
the therapist acts something like a coach, exhorting and encouraging
the patient to use what she has learned in therapy to deal with the
crisis at hand. Consistent with this end, Linehan is clear that thera-
pists are not to engage in psychotherapy during telephone contacts;
rather, therapists are to assist patients in addressing whatever prob-
lem precipitated the call.'2
The structure and purpose of phone calls provides the therapist
an excellent opportunity to assess how the patient handles a crisis
situation. Many therapists must assess in an office a borderline pa-
tient's competence to engage in treatment, far removed both in space
and in time from any problem the patient may actually encounter.
DBT, in contrast, provides-as a central part of the treatment-a
mechanism for the therapist to assess the patient during what the pa-
tient experiences as a crisis. Put another way, through the use of
telephone contacts, DBT brings therapist and patient together in the
very moment the patient is having the most difficulty and thus pro-
vides the therapist a first-hand opportunity to examine the degree to
which the patient is competent to engage in treatment.
Diary cards and telephone contacts are central features of DBT.
Each has important therapeutic benefits. Each also is highly relevant
to the question of informed consent. Their significance lies in how
124. Id. at 500.
125. See id. at 500-01.
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diary cards and telephone contacts allow the therapist to assess
whether the patient is competent to engage in the treatment; that is,
whether the patient can monitor, report, and appropriately commu-
nicate difficult and potentially life-threatening internal states. The
protocol of DBT allows this assessment to Occur in an ongoing man-
ner and so takes into consideration the fluctuating nature of the bor-
derline individual's mental and emotional states. The assessment of
competence sets the stage for another ongoing process, that of ob-
taining informed consent to the treatment. Obtaining informed con-
sent consists of informing the patient about relevant aspects of the
treatment and of obtaining the patient's consent.
VII. INFORMING THE PATIENT
An essential component of obtaining informed consent is provid-
ing the patient information about the nature, purpose, risks, and
benefits of the therapy. DBT builds the provision of such informa-
tion directly into the initial part of the treatment. During the first
several sessions, the treatment is explained in detail. The explana-
tions consist of the most rudimentary details about the therapy-for
example, how often sessions occur, how long they last, and how mat-
ters such as payment and missed sessions are handled.
On a deeper level, the patient is oriented to the philosophy that
underlies the treatment. Linehan identifies six themes to the phi-
losophy of DBT that must be shared before the patient has been ade-
quately informed.12 Patients are told:
(1) The treatment is supportive, insofar as its aim is to de-
crease self-injurious behavior and increase satisfaction with
life;
(2) The treatment is behavioral, insofar as its focus is care-
fully to analyze behavior, to increase positive behaviors, and
to decrease maladaptive behaviors;
(3) The treatment is cognitive, insofar as it will help the pa-
tient examine and change problematic beliefs, expectations,
and assumptions;
(4) The treatment is skill-oriented, insofar as it helps the
patient to improve skills for dealing with everyday life;
(5) The treatment balances acceptance and change, insofar
as it helps the patient both to tolerate painful feelings and to
126. See id at 442-43.
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change problematic ways of relating to her world;
(6) The treatment is based upon a collaborative relation-
ship. 
7
By beginning the treatment in this manner, Linehan informs the pa-
tient of the treatment's technical aspects, as well as of the theory that
underlies DBT's technique. 12'
Another aspect of orienting the patient to the treatment is
agreeing on treatment goals. For the first part of the treatment, the
goals are ordered in hierarchical fashion. These goals are to reduce
parasuicidal and life-threatening behaviors, to reduce behaviors that
interfere with therapy, and to reduce behaviors that interfere with the
patient's quality of life. Again, agreement on these goals is necessary
before the treatment can proceed. Thus, the patient is explicitly in-
formed about the goals of treatment before the work can begin. As
the treatment progresses, new goals are identified and agreed to.
Goals beyond those initially agreed to include addressing post-
traumatic stress symptoms and decreasing problems in living.
Another requirement for consent to be informed is that the pa-
tient be apprised of the risks and benefits of the treatment. As Line-
han sees it, the benefit of DBT is a life worth living.129 She is clear
that, left untreated, most borderline patients lead lives that are un-
bearable. Linehan is equally explicit with patients about the risks of
treatment.13 ° She likens engaging DBT to climbing an aluminum lad-
der, placed in the basement of a house, in the midst of burning
coals. 31 The patient's choice is to remain standing on the coals, or to
begin climbing the ladder." Unfortunately, because the ladder is
aluminum, it is also red-hot and scorches the patient as she begins to
make her way out of the basement.' Linehan uses this metaphor in
part to capture the painful feelings patients will experience as they
engage in the treatment.'3 While the goal is to climb out of the
basement, achieving the goal will almost certainly entail excruciating
pain.
The most serious risk of DBT is the risk of death. Linehan is
127. See id.
128. See id. at 438-48.
129. See id. at 100.
130. Marsha M. Linehan, Address on Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Treating
the Difficult-to-Manage Borderline Client (June 1997).
131. See id.
132 See id.
133. See id.
134. See id
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succinct in how she balances this risk against the treatment's benefit:
"[a]cceptance of the possibility that the patient may commit suicide is
an essential requisite for conducting DBT. The other alternative,
however-in which the patient stays alive, but within a life filled with
intolerable emotional pain-is not viewed as tenable." 135 Linehan
sees the willingness to take risks as an essential attribute of a dialecti-
cal behavior therapist. 6 Such willingness is necessary if the therapist
is to help the patient not revert to a more familiar, albeit more dan-
gerous and painful, way of life.
Perhaps the risk experienced by therapists most acutely-a risk
that implicates what mental health professionals experience as the
risk of life or death-will arise from Linehan's position on inpatient
hospitalization. Linehan sees inpatient hospitalization to be clinically
contraindicated for the vast majority of borderline individuals. 137 As
a consequence, she makes clear that a goal of DBT is to keep patients
138
out of the hospital .
Linehan's clinical reasons for her bias against inpatient hospitali-
zation are shared with individuals entering therapy. 13 Patients are
thus informed about DBT's posture in this regard. The bias against
inpatient hospitalizations is sufficiently strong that patients who are
brought to emergency rooms are exhorted to educate emergency per-
sonnel about the reasons they should not be placed on a locked psy-
chiatric unit.
Linehan also takes care to inform patients that other treatments
are available and may be more helpful than DBT.14 She is particu-
larly attentive to how patients may come to a dialectical behavior
therapist in a mental state that makes them prone to accept a treat-
ment without a careful consideration of its realistic benefits and
without being aware that other treatments may be available. 4
It is sometimes so easy to focus on getting a commitment
from the patient that the therapist forgets to consider care-
fully whether his or her treatment can actually help the pa-
tient as much as or better than available alternative treat-
ments .... When individuals come to treatment in crisis,
ready and willing to commit to anything, it is particularly
135. LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 108.
136. See icL at 107-08.
137. See id. at 510-11.
13& See id.
139. See id- at 438-48.
140. See id. at 445.
141. See id.
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easy to rush into treating them without giving this the care-
ful consideration such a commitment warrants. Facile
promises of therapy can readily inspire hope in a desperate
patient, but for just this reason they may be extremely diffi-
cult to break without serious damage to the patient. In most
cases, the therapist should not promise continuing treatment
during the first session. I usually tell a potential patient that
we will use the first two or three sessions to assess whether
we can work together and whether the person's problems
are the type that I am able to treat. Between sessions, I
consider whether I am able and willing to offer potentially
effective treatment for this particular individual; if so, a firm
commitment is made .... If not, I help the person find al-
ternative treatment.142
By actually helping the patient find an alternative treatment, Linehan
takes the idea of informing the patient about such treatments a step
further. In doing so, she brings to life the idea behind the doctrine of
informed consent. Put another way, Linehani goes further than sim-
ply providing a patient information about other treatments-she
makes those treatments real by actively helping a patient to find
them.
Informing the patient is a necessary element of informed con-
sent. Built into DBT are mechanisms for informing the patient about
the nature, purposes, risks, and benefits of the treatment, as well as
about other available treatments. Behind these mechanisms lies an
underlying theme that patients who come to DBT are often desper-
ate and so must not be promised more than the therapy can realisti-
cally deliver. In these ways, DBT supports the value behind the doc-
trine of informed consent, that of providing the relevant information
in a manner that allows the patient to exercise an autonomous choice.
VIII. CONSENT
Consent speaks to the patient's decision to accept or refuse the
treatment offered. Adequate consent requires that the patient volun-
tarily embrace the treatment, free from undue coercion. For DBT,
consent to treatment takes the form of a commitment that the patient
makes to begin the therapy. This commitment must be explicit and
must come after the patient has been informed about the therapy.143
142 Id
143. See infra Part VI.
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Consent to treatment, in the form of a commitment, has been shown
to be significantly related to future performance.14 Thus, in addition
to fulfilling a necessary legal requirement, consent to treatment car-
ries potential therapeutic benefits as well.
Linehan is explicit and unwavering in her position that patients
must commit to treatment goals and to the six patient agreements be-
fore any actual treatment takes place. 4'
Until the necessary verbal commitments are made, the
therapist should not proceed to discuss any other topic.
There should be no investigations of the patient's past to get
clues about her "resistance"; no discussions of the patient's
emotional misery or life chaos to get a better understanding
of why she simply can't commit right now .... This point is
crucial because the patients sometimes balk at one or more
of the DBT commitments ....
.... Starting therapy without the requisite patient commit-
ment is like being a train engineer who is in such a hurry to
get the train passengers somewhere that he or she starts the
engine car out of the station before the passenger cars are
securely fastened. No matter how fast that engine goes,
those passengers left in the station are not going to reach
their destination any faster. Borderline patients typically
have great difficulty making a commitment to work on re-
ducing parasuicide and suicide risk.1'
Linehan's metaphor-that of a train leaving the station without its
most important passenger-highlights the centrality of the therapist
attending to the patient's values, goals, and readiness for treatment.
Linehan's view of commitment to treatment is complex. Three
aspects of the manner in which patients are asked to commit to
treatment merit discussion: first, that the level of commitment varies
according to how far the patient has progressed in treatment; second,
that commitments are usually not fully present in the sense that even
having made a commitment, a patient will tend to waiver in the
strength of that commitment; and third, that commitment is an ongo-
144. See LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
284; see generally Sharon M. Hall et al., Commitment to Abstinence and Acute
Stress in Relapse to Alcohol, Opiates, and Nicotine, 58 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 175 (1990) (xiiscussing commitment levels of patients).
145. See LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
444-45.
146. Id. at 445.
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ing process. These three aspects of patient consent to treatment
serve to acknowledge that consent to treatment is not a single, binary
event. Rather, what a treatment requires from a patient may vary
significantly as the treatment goes forward.
First, Linehan sees different commitments as necessary at differ-
ent points in the treatment.1 47 At the initial stages, the commitment is
straightforward: the patient commits to participate in DBT with a
given therapist for a given amount of time, to keep the six patient
agreements, to reduce self-injurious behavior, and to build a more
worthwhile life. 48 As the treatment moves on, a greater commitment
is required. 49 The patient is asked to collaborate in specific treat-
ment procedures that target particular thoughts, feelings, and behav-
iors. At yet a third level, the patient is asked to commit to attempt-
ing to apply techniques learned in the therapy to new situations 
50
Thus, as the focus of the therapy changes according to progress the
patient has made, the patient is asked to make additional, explicit
commitments to the work.
Second, Linehan recognizes that commitments made rarely
continue without wavering in strength.' For this reason, she ex-
horts therapists to assess continually the level of commitment to the
treatment.1 52 When the patient's commitment is extremely weak-
perhaps nonexistent-DBT requires that the commitment to treat-
ment be renewed before the work can continue. Thus, commitment
to treatment must continually be remade.
Third, Linehan views commitment to treatment as an ongoing
process. 53 This view is consistent with commentators who view in-
formed consent as a process, rather than as an event. The process of
commitment in DBT has as its basis the propensity of patients to
waiver in their level of commitment.'- 4 According to Linehan, the
process of commitment and recommitment is expectable, and she
makes clear that this process is a central aspect of the therapy.155
Throughout treatment, the therapist can expect that the pa-
147. See id. at 284-85.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152 See id.
153. See id.
154. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 75, at 151.
155. See LINEHAN, CoGNmvE-BEHAvIORAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at
284-85.
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tient will need reminding of the commitments she has made,
as well as assistance in refining, expanding, and remaking
behavioral commitments (sometimes over and over). In
some cases, a patient and I have had to go back to the origi-
nal commitment several times within a single (very difficult)
session, making and remaking it. On other occasions, one
or more whole sessions may be needed to readdress issues
of commitment to change, to DBT, or to particular proce-
dures. A failure in commitment should be one of the first
things assessed (but not assumed) when a problem in ther-
apy arises .... Once recommitment is made, both can pro-
ceed with addressing the problem at hand. 6
Put more succinctly, "[c]ommitments made must be remade."
' 157
A patient's consent is the final stage of a process whereby the
patient makes an autonomous choice to engage in treatment. That
process can be broken down into three prior stages: establishing a
relationship structured to foster the patient's autonomy, assessing the
patient's competence to engage in the treatment, and providing in-
formation necessary for the patient to make an informed choice
about whether to accept the treatment offered. DBT is the only
treatment that has demonstrated efficacy in treating borderline pa-
tients who engage in intentionally self-injurious behavior."' DBT is
also a treatment that has built directly into its protocol aspects that
address each element of informed consent. In a word, there appears
to be an especially good fit between the values behind the legal doc-
trine of informed consent and the therapeutic elements that make
DBT a beneficial treatment for borderline individuals.
IX. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE RECONSIDERED
This Article has examined how the principles underlying DBT
and the values underlying the doctrine of informed consent converge.
This convergence demonstrates that a body of law can serve a par-
ticular population's therapeutic interests. To put the matter another
way, we have engaged in a detailed therapeutic jurisprudence analy-
sis that relies not just on common sense and speculation, but on out-
come studies as well. Informed consent is not merely a good idea for
borderline patients-it is an integral part of the only treatment that
156. Id. at 285.
157. Id- at 291.
158. See id at 4-5.
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has been shown to be effective for patients who struggle with this
disorder. As straightforward as this analysis may seem, it raises a
number of interesting and important questions for the entire enter-
prise of therapeutic jurisprudence. We draw eight lessons from our
analysis.
The first lesson is that the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic impli-
cations of a law are often overlooked. Aside from Gutheil and Win-
ick,159 few have examined the clinical effect of informed consent on
patients. Fewer still have explored the legal implications that flow
from discovering that hospitalization is contrary to the therapeutic
interests of a certain class of patients. Therapeutic jurisprudence
serves as a call to examine and explore how laws affect a specific
population. When laws affect a population identified as having clini-
cal needs, the relevance of such a project is evident; therapeutic ju-
risprudence nonetheless demands that the clinical implications of all
laws be studied.
The second lesson of our analysis is that therapeutic jurispru-
dence has been able to show that the therapeutic and autonomy in-
terests of patients often coincide. Winick, for example, has demon-
strated that a right to refuse treatment both promotes the patient
autonomy and enhances the likelihood of a positive treatment out-
come.160 In the case of DBT, we have shown that promoting patient
autonomy is not merely a benefit of the therapy-it is a treatment
goal toward which much of the therapy's technique and theory is di-
rected. Society should be especially pleased when autonomy benefits
and treatment benefits coincide, and one accomplishment of thera-
peutic jurisprudence to date has been to show when and how this oc-
curs.
The third lesson is that therapeutic jurisprudence must face the
difficult issue of who gets to decide which rules are therapeutic. To
take Winick's example again, allowing a right to refuse treatment-
thereby promoting the value of choice-best serves patients' inter-
ests. It is not at all clear, however, whether most psychiatrists would
agree with this assessment. It may well be that many psychiatrists
would force a chronically ill patient to accept an anti psychotic medi-
cation, even at the expense the patient's self-respect. These psychia-
trists might point out that while patients invested in treatment are
more likely to benefit, society is nevertheless able to force compli-
159. See Gutheil, Medicolegal Pitfalls, supra note 46; Gutheil, Suicide and Suit,
supra note 56; Winick, supra note 1.
160. See Winick, supra note 1, at 328.
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ance on unwilling patients, thereby ensuring that such patients do re-
ceive medications with demonstrated efficacy.
The question then becomes: "Who determines what is thera-
peutic?" On the one hand, the community of mental health profes-
sionals may argue that its expertise lies precisely in deciding what
constitutes mental health and mental illness, so mental health pro-
fessionals should be the arbiters in this regard. After all, this com-
munity would point out, mental health professionals are the experts
in deciding what goes into the DSM-IV, the most widely used no-
sology of mental illness in the United States.
Other groups will likely counter that therapeutic benefits extend
far beyond the expertise covered in mental health training. Philoso-
phers and clerics, for example, might choose to argue that much goes
into the idea of therapeutic over and above clinical definitions of
mental health and mental illness. When multiple definitions of
"therapeutic" coincide, as occurs when promoting autonomy and
providing good clinical treatment go hand-in-hand, this problem is
mostly hidden. When, however, definitions of "therapeutic" diverge,
therapeutic jurisprudence must offer some way of determining who
will be the arbiter of what lies in the patient's best therapeutic inter-
ests.
The fourth lesson of our analysis is that even if we do decide
which group will determine what is therapeutic, members within the
group may disagree, and the law may not be in a good position to
adjudicate the dispute. This problem is evident in how the law as-
sesses social science evidence; numerous commentators have pointed
out how poorly the law is equipped to weigh competing claims, all of
which are allegedly grounded in scientific methodology.16 1 In our ex-
ample above consider what would happen should dialectical behavior
therapists say one thing is therapeutically indicated, while clinicians
from another theoretical perspective-perhaps psychoanalysis-
claim that something quite different is in the patient's therapeutic in-
terests. The problem is exacerbated because, as Chris Slobogin has
noted, the questions raised by therapeutic jurisprudence are pecu-
liarly difficult to study by accepted research methods.162 The ques-
tions are large, with many variables, and ethical constraints limit what
research can actually be done. How to address this problem poses a
161. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Overruled: Jury Neutrality in Capital Cases, 21
STAN. LAW. 11, 11-12 (1986).
162. See Christopher Slobogin, 1 Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to
Ponder, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 193,207-08 (1995).
April 1998]
980 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:945
significant challenge to therapeutic jurisprudence.
The fifth lesson is that we need to be concerned with the thera-
peutic interests of all individuals affected by a certain law. In the
mental health law context we may care most about the therapeutic
benefits of a law or policy for patients. At the same time, however,
we need to consider other actors in the system and their incentives
for acting in one way or another in order to achieve those therapeutic
benefits. In our example therapists struggle with strong counter-
transference feelings, often entailing anxieties that they will be sued
following an untoward event. These anxieties may lead clinicians to
place patients on locked units when doing so is neither necessary nor
clinically indicated. Thus, anxiety may provoke a clinician into a
course of action that impairs both a patient's therapeutic and auton-
omy interests. Therapeutic jurisprudence requires an examination
not only of how a law or policy will affect patients; it requires an ex-
amination of how a law or policy will affect other actors, such as
treaters, as well.
The sixth lesson of our analysis flows from the fifth. Therapists
have therapeutic interests no less than patients. The law's current
structure may be such that the anxiety experienced by treaters is
quelled by committing a potentially self-injurious patient to the hos-
pital, even though hospitalization may not be the treatment of choice
for the patient. If we focus on what is clinically indicated for patients,
we may find that these interests conflict with what is clinically indi-
cated for therapists. This dilemma thus raises a normative question:
whose therapeutic interests should prevail when there is a conflict?
To take another example, many different actors populate the child
custody context. Therapeutic jurisprudence needs to address how the
clinical benefits of these actors are to be weighed against one an-
other. Perhaps a slight decrement to a child's well-being would result
in a significant and lasting increment to a parent's well-being. Thera-
peutic jurisprudence must provide a way to determine whose inter-
ests count, how those interests are weighed against one another, and
who will decide these questions.
The seventh lesson of our analysis is that, even should we be able
to identify where the therapeutic interests lie, to decide how to weigh
the interests of various actors against one another, and to determine
who is the arbiter of these questions, therapeutic jurisprudence still
faces the problem of how to weigh therapeutic values against other
values. Therapeutic jurisprudence has not yet provided a way of
choosing among competing values or of balancing other values
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against therapeutic values. Take, as an example, the question of what
to do when an individual with multiple personality disorder commits
a crime. Perhaps it could be satisfactorily demonstrated that absolv-
ing this person of criminal responsibility is in her best therapeutic in-
terest. Nevertheless, exoneration from criminal responsibility may
not serve the goals of the criminal justice system.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has not yet provided a way to recon-
cile this kind of conflict. If therapeutic jurisprudence says only that
the law may legitimately consider therapeutic interests, it has not got-
ten terribly far. Legal scholarship is essentially normative, and good
legal scholarship provides a way to address difficult questions raised
by competing values. A future task of therapeutic jurisprudence is
therefore to indicate how therapeutic interests are balanced against
other legitimate interests. In a word, the task is to define what is ju-
risprudential about therapeutic jurisprudence-an issue that has yet
to be satisfactorily explored.
The final lesson in therapeutic jurisprudence refers to a condi-
tion that plagues much of legal scholarship-a condition that makes
bringing law professors, law practitioners, and mental health profes-
sionals together so vitally important. The point is that knowing what
is therapeutic is not enough to design a system that implements
therapeutic interests. To take an example from our exercise, it may
benefit patients enormously to change laws that govern the involun-
tary admission of patients to psychiatric wards. But unless advocates
of therapeutic jurisprudence are good lobbyists, or unless we can de-
velop a persuasive legal theory to achieve that end through the
courts, our insights may come to naught. While therapeutic jurispru-
dence promises a law reform agenda, more actors than legal and psy-
chiatric scholars will be needed to carry out that agenda.
X. CONCLUSION
We have drawn eight lessons from our exercise in therapeutic
jurisprudence. The lessons fall into two broad categories, the first of
which concerns therapeutic questions and the second of which con-
cerns jurisprudential questions. Therapeutic questions speak to the
limits on our ability to discern what is therapeutic and to implement
what we have learned. Jurisprudential questions concern the very na-
ture of how we define "therapeutic," the challenge of balancing
therapeutic interests against other values society holds dear, the
challenge of balancing the therapeutic interests of actors within a sys-
tem who may have conflicting interests, and the problem of deciding
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who is the final arbiter of these and other questions. By addressing
these questions this new movement in the law may properly be called
therapeutic jurisprudence, as well as therapeutic jurisprudence.
